

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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Remarks

To #14: Please see DDCI's note on the attached letter.

STAT _____

Executive Secretary

8 Jun '88

Date

3637 (10-81)

Executive Registry

88-2369X

The Washington Times

3600 NEW YORK AVENUE NORTHEAST
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002 / 202-636-3000

June 2, 1988

*HPAD -
let's discuss.*


Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
CIA
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Bob:

Enclosed please find a copy of an article I wrote about the KGB under Soviet reforms. I thought you might be interested in it, so I sent it along.

I'm also in the process of writing a book about the KGB and I would like to meet with you sometime to discuss the subject. Please let me know if this would be possible.

Sincerely,



Bill Gertz
National Security Affairs Reporter

encl.



P-308-IR

THE KGB AND SOVIET REFORM

by William Gertz

The Soviet Union's State Committee for Security, the notorious KGB intelligence and internal-security service, remains the self-described "sword and shield" of the Soviet Communist Party. It is playing a major role in controlling the current thaw in rigid totalitarian control over Soviet society that has emerged as part of the economic and social-reform programs launched in 1985 by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Under Gorbachev, internal controls over selected elements of society, such as the state-controlled press and the intelligentsia, have been loosened. A number of imprisoned ideological opponents, many of whom were well known outside the Soviet Union, have been released from prison camps or internal exile. And emigration levels, strictly controlled by the government, have risen modestly in an apparent effort to appease critics of Moscow's human rights policies.

Yet no systemic changes in the ruling bureaucracy, either in the Communist Party or the Soviet government, appear to have been made. The KGB, in particular, has remained one of the few institutions that has not become an announced target of reform.

A lack of evidence supporting the existence of any positive or fundamental changes in the Soviet system under Gorbachev has led critics of the Soviet Union to view the current period as a temporary sidetrack from the path

to the Soviets' proclaimed revolutionary ideal of establishing a world socialist order.

Despite President Reagan's re-

cently stated opinion that Gorbachev is a less messianic communist than his predecessors, the Soviet leadership remains un-



KGB agents break for a cigarette at the 1986 Iceland summit. Intelligence experts report that the KGB is currently responsible for domestic political control and foreign intelligence operations.

WALLY MCNAMEE/WOODFIN CAMP & ASSOC.

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daunted in its quest for global revolution. In fact, Moscow's rulers seek a more efficient, attractive, and thus more exportable brand of Soviet-style socialism than the one they've been peddling for the past 70 years.

For many Western analysts, the KGB is regarded as a bastion of opposition to Gorbachev's reform programs, known as *perestroika* (economic restructuring) and *glasnost*, a corollary program involving a new level of openness. Yet, it is still not clear whether the KGB and its leaders are anti-glasnost. In the past, efforts to portray this powerful and highly influential component of the party-state apparatus as "conservative" have been used as a propaganda ploy to depict the Soviet leadership as a small group, divided along Western political lines. In fact, it is more unified.

Playing the lead

The closed nature of Soviet society and the secrecy integral to the KGB make it difficult to say with certainty or precision what role the internal security services are playing as part of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Statements by current Soviet leaders, published accounts in the Western and Soviet press, and an examination of similar, short-lived periods in Soviet history when relaxations of communist dictatorship occurred, reveal the KGB's role as the stage manager—within the Leninist tradition of ideological flexibility, of reform programs designed to strengthen and perpetuate Soviet power and prestige.

At the top of the KGB is Chair-

man Victor Chebrikov. He is a member of the ruling Politburo, the entity that sits at the apex of the Communist Party hierarchy and thus controls the entire government apparatus. Chebrikov's public statements have shown him to be wary of internal reforms. Like Gorbachev, Chebrikov is a protégé of Yuri Andropov, who ran the KGB from 1967 until he became the Soviet leader in 1982. It was then that Chebrikov assumed KGB control.

Chebrikov's public attitude toward *glasnost* appeared in a KGB statement issued in January 1987 that many analysts have viewed as a key indicator of the security organ's participation in *perestroika* and *glasnost*. A front-page article in *Pravda* revealed that a KGB operative had been fired for illegally arresting a Soviet "investigative reporter" in the Ukraine. Two KGB colonels who had searched the reporter's residence were also chastised and, days after the incident, the Politburo-run Central Committee, which rules over the KGB, ordered the institution to improve its political police work "in conditions of the spread of democracy and openness, relying on the trust and support of the people."

Analysts viewed the notice and the entire incident as a ploy meant as a signal from the leadership to the Soviet population that officially sanctioned members of the media who express their views freely under *glasnost* would be protected from official reprisals. Intelligence experts have pointed out that the announcement of the KGB agent's arrest was not unprecedented, since similar tactics have been

used in the past.

Freedom is relative

The relaxation of restrictions appear to be part of what has been called "feel-good" measures designed to increase popular enthusiasm for the economic reforms. What Soviet leaders have come to realize is that the KGB has been more repressive than it needs to be to maintain party and state control.

Since Gorbachev launched his reforms, several new laws and regulations have been imposed or are under consideration. Other laws have been modified or repealed, which appeared liberal on the surface but would have given the KGB, over time, even more draconian control than it now exercises. Some laws forbidding free expression were repealed, but the catchall statutes used to imprison dissidents remain on the books.

Valentin Falin, chairman of the Novosti Press Agency and a hard-line propagandist, recently backed a new Soviet press law. He boasted the law would tighten restrictions and "close the gaps" in current legislation that have permitted the existence of nonofficial publications, the lifeblood of the small but influential political, religious, and ethnic opposition in the Soviet Union.

Sergei Grigoryants, a leading Moscow dissident author, has said that new regulations designed to shift government control over the psychiatric hospital system from the Interior to the Health ministry are not likely to end KGB abuse of psychiatry to curb political dissent. Grigoryants, who spent eight years in a labor camp

as a political prisoner, said the KGB uses unlawful incarceration of dissidents in psycho-prison as a way to circumvent the legal system. He advocates the removal of psychiatrists and KGB doctors responsible for psychiatric abuse.

Grigoryants, released from prison early in 1987, sees the new press law as a communist method of ending the underground free press. He edits and publishes an unofficial journal called *Glasnost* that until late 1987 was tolerated by Soviet authorities. The KGB seized copies of the journal and harassed its contributors. The security organ also pressed the literary magazine *Novy Mir* into severing its contract with Grigoryants, thus leaving him vulnerable to arrest. "In our country, being unemployed is grounds for arrest," he said. Grigoryants and several other dissidents were viciously attacked and beaten by the KGB in an apparent renewal of violence by the state security organs against dissidents.

Demonstrators who gathered outside the KGB's Moscow headquarters on December 20, 1987, during a protest to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the state security police, were arrested, and some were severely beaten.

A senior U.S. intelligence official who specializes in Soviet affairs believes the KGB has been directed by the Soviet leadership to manage glasnost in ways that permit the authority of the Communist Party dictatorship to remain unchallenged. The KGB, according to the official, has been tasked to set wider parameters for permissible activities than in previous times, but also to avoid taking harsh and highly inflam-



A KGB agent peers from his car. The estimated tally of full- and part-time KGB agents is 490,000.

matory repressive actions against dissenters to avoid arousing Western indignation. In the past several years, dissidents and other Soviet citizens have taken advantage of the new period of relaxed restrictions to take to the streets in demonstrations, or to launch unofficial publications. The KGB has also been forced by circumstances to contend with a large number of unofficial groups, whose very existence, formed around such topics as music, sports, and literature, is a protest against the communist monopoly on power.

While much of perestroika and glasnost has been heralded by the Soviets as a "broadening of democracy," the phrase should not be confused with Western democracy. In *The Cheka*, a study of Lenin's political police, British intelligence specialist George Leggett wrote: "Democracy, freedom, and justice were relative terms to Lenin, to be interpreted according

The KGB, in particular, has remained one of the few institutions that have not become an announced target of reform.

to their application in the class struggle: Constitutional democracy was a capitalist trap, freedom was solely for the proletariat, justice valid only when it was revolutionary." It is in this context that current Soviet internal changes should be viewed.

Nationalism condoned?

Chebrikov echoed this theme during a September 1987 speech in Moscow when he attacked Western security services for al-

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
■ CURRENT ISSUES

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legedly instigating public protests. This is a classic example of how the Soviets have used the charge of foreign meddling in their domestic affairs, a favorite tactic since 1917, to justify political coercion in the furtherance of protecting a government that lacks legitimacy. Commenting on this alleged meddling, Chebrikov condemned Western security services for spreading the "virus of nationalism" during the December 1986 riots in Soviet Central Asia, protests by Crimean Tatars in Moscow in the summer of 1987, and nationalist manifestations in the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in August 1987. He charged that "extremists" linked to the West had infiltrated unofficial groups behind the demonstrations. "One gets the impression," Chebrikov stated, "that these people have understood the process of the broadening of democracy as a possibility to do anything that comes into their heads without punishment and act against the interests of Soviet society." Referring to the use of the security organs during Joseph Stalin's reign of terror, Chebrikov went on to state that the late 1930s were a "departure" from Leninism, and that political and legal guarantees had been created in support of Gorbachev's reforms.

The KGB's tactics during glasnost were evinced in the handling of the Tatar protests. Instead of carrying out mass arrests during the Red Square demonstrations held by hundreds of Tatars, who were deported from their homeland by Stalin, KGB security agents singled out demonstration leaders and forced them to leave Moscow immediately by train. To

win public support for squelching the demonstration, the KGB falsely accused a U.S. diplomat of



The Moscow headquarters of the KGB sits at the apex of the Soviets' totalitarian state.

starting the protests, a charge U.S. officials denied. "It appears they've been told to handle public demonstrations with kid gloves," the intelligence official said of the handling of the Tatar protests.

Relaxed restrictions on emigration also have been used by the Soviets in an attempt to limit Western criticism of the denial of free emigration. Gorbachev de-

fended the practice of denying exit visas to Jews as the Soviet response to what he termed a Western-inspired "brain drain." Although Jewish, Armenian, and German emigration rose modestly in 1987, Soviet authorities also imposed a harsh new law on Jews that limits applicants for emigration to those with close relatives abroad. The law has had the effect of curbing emigration requests from those who see no hope for gaining permission to leave.

A global setup?

Gorbachev, as the architect of perestroika and glasnost, is clearly the prime mover in Soviet reform, and knowledge of his views is important for understanding the rationale behind the policies of the current crop of Soviet leaders who set the KGB's policies and direct its activities. He was described recently by a Soviet émigré who knew him in law school as a zealous Stalinist who expressed an abnormal veneration of Vladimir Lenin. The émigré, Fredrikh Nezansky, identified Gorbachev as a devotee of Lenin's doctrine of revolutionary flexibility: the doctrine of one step forward, two steps back—or the ability to achieve objectives through tactical maneuverability. In his new book, *Perestroika*, Gorbachev writes, "In politics and ideology, we are seeking to revive the spirit of Leninism."

For the most part, Gorbachev's implementation of recent internal changes in the Soviet Union has occurred within the framework of his national program of economic revival. Most observers agree this strategy is designed to prevent

the Soviet Union from losing its status as a world power in the face of a burgeoning worldwide technological revolution.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Soviet affairs specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former Carter administration national security adviser, describes the Soviet Union as a "corrupt, stagnant, and brutal system" that through perestroika is seeking to recover its standing in the world. Once regarded by many developing nations as a model for progress, the Soviet Union today stands discredited because of its inability to compete economically with the West, Brzezinski says. Behind the recent Washington summit, according to Brzezinski, is a Soviet drive for "breathing space" that will allow them to catch up. "The Soviets realize they are losing the historical competition with the United States. . . . They know they are hopelessly behind, not just in such areas as computer technology and industrial robotics, but in providing the basic amenities of life."

No cuts in the KGB

Externally, the KGB has shown no signs of curbing its \$4 billion annual program of large-scale "active measures"—covert and overt propaganda and intelligence operations—to influence foreign governments and publics into viewing the Soviet Union more positively and as less of a threat.

Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Communist Party has revitalized its Information Department and strengthened its international apparatus of front groups that seek to advance Soviet policies. The

KGB has been very active in these groups, especially the Soviet Peace Committee. The committee's new director is Genrikh Borovik, identified as a former KGB operative who maintains close ties to the KGB through his brother-in-law Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of all KGB overseas operations.

The KGB also plays a part in the active diplomatic efforts that have been a part of Gorbachev's reforms. At the recent U.S.-Soviet summit, for example, KGB foreign-operations chief Kryuchkov was part of the Soviet delegation in Washington.

Other enhanced Soviet diplomatic efforts have been directed toward the Middle East and long-time rival China, where improved relations have emerged. Ties with West Germany and Great Britain also have been augmented within Gorbachev's stated objective of improving the possibilities for greater economic exchange. At a dinner with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher last year, Gorbachev called for fewer restrictions on Soviet access to Western technology as a precondition for better relations.

Many of the recent U.S. espionage cases involving federal arrests and investigations of Soviet spies involved attempts to steal or acquire through agents classified high-technology data useful for Soviet military purposes. High-tech spying is one indication of the important role the KGB plays in supporting economic reform.

Also, KGB penetrations of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, including the implantation of sophisticated listening devices in the new Moscow chancery and the seduction and attempted recruitment

of a Marine security guard, have shown that the KGB has not slackened in its espionage efforts, despite a warming of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Under the direction of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the KGB's role in supervising the ideological dimension of foreign policy will remain strong. Soviet diplomacy and intelligence operations abroad are seen by many experts as a convenient method of reducing external pressures, a justification for high military expenditures that could allow valuable resources to be diverted to revamping much of the outdated 1930s-era industrial infrastructure. Shevardnadze, for his part, has been viewed by Western analysts as a possible

The KGB stands at the core of the world's largest totalitarian police state.

replacement for Chebrikov, a move that would allow Anatoli Dobrynin, head of the Information Department, to take over the foreign ministry.

Any understanding of the KGB's role must be viewed within the context of its position and mission within the Soviet party-state bureaucracy.

Soviet security history

The KGB security apparatus is unique in the annals of modern history. It stands at the core of the world's largest totalitarian police state and is the action arm

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Vitaly Yurchenko (center) "redefects" to Moscow. Recently, the KGB has been tasked with softening its actions against dissenters.

of a political party that for 70 years has sought to exercise total control over virtually all aspects of human endeavor in the name of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The KGB today is charged with the dual responsibilities of exercising internal political control over Soviet society and conducting foreign intelligence collection and operations abroad. Although estimates of KGB personnel are all but impossible to verify, author John Barron, a specialist on the KGB, put the number of professional KGB officers at about 90,000. The network of Soviets who serve as internal security operatives and informants has been estimated at an additional 400,000.

The KGB is a direct descendant of the Cheka, the name given to Lenin's ad hoc political police bureau, which sprang up only weeks after the first communist regime was established in 1917. Answerable only to the bolshevik Council of People's Commissars,

the Cheka under Lenin and his deputy Felix Dzerzhinsky quickly assumed powers of arrest, trial, imprisonment, and execution, and launched a reign of terror that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent victims.

The pattern followed by Soviet leaders seeking perestroika and glasnost is very similar to Lenin's first tactical retreat from communism. The program was launched in 1921 under what was called the New Economic Policy (NEP), a term repeated by Gorbachev as he pushed his reforms. The NEP permitted private trading, allowed the establishment of foreign investment, and abolished a system of food requisitioning.

With the civil war essentially over in 1921, Lenin found the Soviet state beset by internal strife and serious economic shortcomings. Under the new program, Lenin overhauled the security police and limited its role. "We are now faced with the task of developing private exchange—that is re-

quired by the New Economic Policy—and that calls for more revolutionary legality," Lenin told the tenth party congress.

Leggett also noted that the NEP had two contrasting consequences that are equally applicable to today's perestroika:

Economic liberalization on the one hand, but political tightening of the screws on the other.

... The implementation of NEP and the relaxation of relations with other countries called for a new, liberalized image of the Soviet state. ... Lenin's New Economic Policy required economic regeneration at home and political conciliation abroad; a precondition of both was the diminution of terror, and its corollary the strengthening of the rule of law.

The roots of the current reform period can be traced to the policies of Andropov. Gorbachev, at one time a minor party functionary in outlying Stavropol Province involved with Soviet agricultural policies, rose to power in 1978 with the support of Andropov and Mikhail Suslov, the late party hard-liner and standard-bearer for communist ideology. Once in power, Andropov launched a series of programs designed to end the corruption that had flourished within the Soviet system under Brezhnev, and Gorbachev served as a key enforcer of the Andropov program. Andropov also initiated an antialcoholism campaign that has been continued under Gorbachev. Soviet officials, questioned about the motive behind glasnost, frequently mention the corruption under

Brezhnev as a primary rationale for glasnost and perestroika.

The KGB also played an important role in Gorbachev's bid to become the top party leader after the death of Brezhnev aide Konstantin Chernenko, one year after he succeeded Andropov in 1984. Gorbachev became Soviet leader after KGB chief Chebrikov, in line with the Andropov-Gorbachev anticorruption drive, helped eliminate Gorbachev's chief rival by claiming to have incriminating evidence of corruption by Victor Grishin, chief of the powerful Moscow party. Thus, Gorbachev assumed power, and within his first two years as general secretary replaced 44 percent of the top leadership, including another leading contender, Grigori Romanov, believed to be Grishin's patron.

While changes in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev have been political in nature, the KGB intelligence service is one of the few institutions that has not been overhauled and is not likely to be weakened. From the Western vantage point, perestroika appears more the product of an imaginative, younger generation of hard-line communist leaders, who see the KGB as an instrument to be used in building a more efficient socialist system, than of a desire for a more benign and less-threatening state, which some observers have hoped for.

Goal: neutralize enemies

Seen from this perspective, the KGB will continue in its role as the modern-day Cheka and will no doubt be more vigilant in maintaining control over, and if necessary neutralizing, whatever op-



Former KGB chief Yuri Andropov (center) sits with former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (left). According to the author, the KGB was a major force in Gorbachev's rise to power.

position develops in the form of political, religious, and ethnic groups that seek more freedoms and reforms than permitted under glasnost.

As Defense Intelligence Agency analyst John J. Dziak stated in his book *Chekisty: A History of the KGB*, the current glasnost initiatives have not altered the essential reality of the Soviet system, in terms of its operational mode. "The State is still above society and the party-state security phalanx sits at the apex of state elites. . . . The KGB of the Andropov-Gorbachev period has long been rehabilitated and once more is the cutting edge of the party, a circumstance pointedly repeated by the party and KGB alike."

Dziak notes that the 24 KGB delegates who attended the important 1986 Communist Party Congress, where perestroika was outlined in great detail, represent a higher degree of party and state

The KGB will no doubt be more vigilant in maintaining control over whatever opposition develops.

security interpenetration than at any time in the post-Stalin era. "The KGB, as did the Cheka, considers itself the sword and most trusted servant of the party. Those duties entail striking enemies and preserving the system in its core essentials. Both Chekists and party apparatchiks historically have demonstrated that in the face of the most dangerous challenges they can energize the counterintelligence state into confronting the threat frontally . . . or through stratagem." ■

William Gertz is a national security affairs reporter for the Washington Times.

Commentary

NATIONAL SECURITY AND FISCAL REALITY: AN IMPENDING COLLISION

by Harlan K. Ullman

To use a maritime metaphor, the ship of state is on a collision course with fiscal reality. The first Reaganaut since former Budget Director David Stockman to sound the alarm publicly was ex-Secretary of the Navy James Webb. His sudden resignation in February will be remembered largely as the result of a policy rift with Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci over defense priorities and naval spending cuts. That controversy, however, reflected only sighting the tip of this looming fiscal iceberg. To the next administration will fall the responsibility of coping with the consequences of collision.

For national security, the immediate impact of hitting this fiscal iceberg will be a significant and swift reduction in overall U.S. military strength and numbers, perhaps by as much as a third and beginning before this decade's end.¹ The most newsworthy questions, as is the case with many dramatic events, will focus on why and how this reduction occurred. The more relevant questions, however, rest in identifying and understanding the consequences for national security, if

any, of this impending diminution of military capability, and determining the likely implications for the broader geostrategic context of U.S. and allied security as well as what damage control measures the new administration and next Congress must consider, given this erosion in military power.

For better or worse, the time remaining in office for the current administration and Congress is far too short for any course corrections even to be considered. Adjustments in commitments and threat assessments are not going to happen.² And, despite the attractive solution of deriving greater value from the dollars spent on defense to arrest the impending decline in military power, the most sweeping and recent attempts at serious reform of the defense process, including the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Law of 1986 and the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Improving Defense Management (the Packard Commission), have simply not yet moved the rudder enough to deflect a future collision.

In all likelihood, the next ad-

ministration will enter office largely unaware of or prepared for this condition. Since it takes time for an administration to fill senior positions and have them approved, and time beyond that to settle into office, the chances are good that the administration will fall behind in addressing these issues. That reality will only serve to complicate our future choices.

Why the decline?

Projecting the overall decline in U.S. military strength precipitated by constrained defense spending is a relatively straightforward exercise. Estimating the political consequences of that decline is in a different universe of predictability. This is because it will be difficult to predict how the public will react to the fact that after a 50 percent real (after inflation) increase in annual defense spending during the Reagan years, we could be left with what may come to be called the incredibly shrinking defense establishment. And it is inherently difficult to determine precisely how much military power is objectively needed to ensure our security. The structural reasons that will cause the decline, however, are much easier to identify.

1. See the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *U.S. Conventional Force Structure at The Crossroads* (Washington, D.C.: November 1985) for the analysis leading to this conclusion.

2. Debate will, of course, focus on U.S. commitments and threat assessment. Given a tendency for administrations to move to the center, generally this has meant no major adjustments occurring for either commitment or threat. This paper assumes this condition will continue. Hence, the resource expenditure process emerges as the issue on which political action could have positive effect.